AOC missed her calling as as stand up comedian.
Basic economics just dosn't come easy for her
Question for the feeble minded.
- Thread starter BodiTheGreat
- Start date
Basic economics just dosn't come easy for her
Not at all. At least read the wiki entry on the Great Recession. You are just parroting the FoxNews take, which is less than half the story.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Recession
Fox is the flip side to MSNBC. And being popular does not equal being accurate. PBS is the closest televised news that is balanced.
I watch both fox and PBS. I happen to think the few actual NEWS programs on FOX are pretty balanced, like Sheppard for example. I don’t think there’s a better balanced political interview program than Wallace on Sunday morning. Guys like Hannity do not provide news, but strictly opinion. I don’t think you can make the same distinctions with CNN or MSNBC, as all NEWS is basically anti conservative or pro Dem opinion.
Bingo.
I tend to actually think that NPR is pretty balanced (even Matt Schlapp with the American Conservative Union said - I think yesterday - that he listens to NPR). So, generally, are the nightly news shows, since they tend to be just news-related with little talking heads based on having to fit things into a half-hour. Politico is also I think generally pretty balanced. I think one issue is that people conflate news branches or news broadcasting with the endless talking heads that appear on most cable TV channels.
Yup. America was founded on judeo- Christian values.
Lmao government TV?
Why would I expect anything else from you
PBS is not "government TV". It is partially funded by tax money but it is independently run. Have you ever even watched it?
There is very little news on Fox. It is 95% opinion. As I said, the flip side to MSNBC (which is just as bad).
Luckily for you, the religion of peace (Islam) still believes that
Interesting considering that the modern parties had yet to be formed.
This idea that somehow the Democrats or the Republicans beliefs of a long time ago somehow reflect on those parties now is completely ludicrous.
I think 5 or 6 institutions/corporations own like 95% of the US media these days regardless of what network or news publication it is (both online and on TV).
The only news i watch on TV is live coverage on CSPAN .. all other news is from independent resources online and independent content creators that cover the news on youtube.
On topics of war/foreign policy/ or economics/poverty in the USA you'll get a better idea of what is really going on by watching RT or Al Jazeera (two stations funded by foreign resources).
There was a time when the media was expected to be critical of the establishment/corporations/power and was there to inform the little guy/average joe -- now they are mostly just pro establishment propaganda outlets.
The only news i watch on TV is live coverage on CSPAN .. all other news is from independent resources online and independent content creators that cover the news on youtube.
On topics of war/foreign policy/ or economics/poverty in the USA you'll get a better idea of what is really going on by watching RT or Al Jazeera (two stations funded by foreign resources).
There was a time when the media was expected to be critical of the establishment/corporations/power and was there to inform the little guy/average joe -- now they are mostly just pro establishment propaganda outlets.
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Its also catagorizes itself as an "entertainment" channel for a reason that is oft overlooked.
No really.
I get the Democrats want to shake the image that has stained them but embracing socialism only adds to the flavor
Deregulation is a red herring to the financial crisis
Governmental policies regarding anyone with a pulse or that could fog up a mirror deserved a home is what caused it starting with al-carter's community reinvestment act and then clinton's signing of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act both of these things occurred so people with a credit score of 400 could own a home while President Bush's administration warned 17 times this was going to happen, countless economists also warned this was going to occur. To say otherwise is a revision of history.
Governmental policies regarding anyone with a pulse or that could fog up a mirror deserved a home is what caused it starting with al-carter's community reinvestment act and then clinton's signing of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act both of these things occurred so people with a credit score of 400 could own a home while President Bush's administration warned 17 times this was going to happen, countless economists also warned this was going to occur. To say otherwise is a revision of history.
Setting the Record Straight: Six Years of Unheeded Warnings for GSE Reform
The Washington Times Fails To Research The Administration's Efforts To Reform Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac
White House News
Setting the Record Straight
In Focus: Economy
Today, the Washington Times incorrectly accused the White House of ignoring warnings of trouble ahead for government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and neglecting to "adopt any reform until this summer," when it was too late. "Neither the White House nor Congress heeded the warnings, Fannie and Freddie retained strong bipartisan support during the 1990s and early part of this decade." (Editorial, "Hear, See And Speak No Evil About Fannie And Freddie," The Washington Times, 10/9/08)
Over the past six years, the President and his Administration have not only warned of the systemic consequences of failure to reform GSEs but also put forward thoughtful plans to reduce the risk that either Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac would encounter such difficulties. In fact, it was Congress that flatly rejected President Bush's call more than five years ago to reform the GSEs. Over the years, the President's repeated attempts to reform the supervision of these entities were thwarted by the legislative maneuvering of those who emphatically denied there were problems with the GSEs.
2001
The Washington Times Fails To Research The Administration's Efforts To Reform Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac
Today, the Washington Times incorrectly accused the White House of ignoring warnings of trouble ahead for government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and neglecting to "adopt any reform until this summer," when it was too late. "Neither the White House nor Congress heeded the warnings, Fannie and Freddie retained strong bipartisan support during the 1990s and early part of this decade." (Editorial, "Hear, See And Speak No Evil About Fannie And Freddie," The Washington Times, 10/9/08)
Over the past six years, the President and his Administration have not only warned of the systemic consequences of failure to reform GSEs but also put forward thoughtful plans to reduce the risk that either Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac would encounter such difficulties. In fact, it was Congress that flatly rejected President Bush's call more than five years ago to reform the GSEs. Over the years, the President's repeated attempts to reform the supervision of these entities were thwarted by the legislative maneuvering of those who emphatically denied there were problems with the GSEs.
2001
- April: The Administration's FY02 budget declares that the size of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is "a potential problem," because "financial trouble of a large GSE could cause strong repercussions in financial markets, affecting Federally insured entities and economic activity." (2002 Budget Analytic Perspectives, pg. 142)
- May: The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) calls for the disclosure and corporate governance principles contained in the President's 10-point plan for corporate responsibility to apply to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. (OMB Prompt Letter to OFHEO, 5/29/02)
- February: The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) releases a report explaining that unexpected problems at a GSE could immediately spread into financial sectors beyond the housing market.
- September: Then-Treasury Secretary John Snow testifies before the House Financial Services Committee to recommend that Congress enact "legislation to create a new Federal agency to regulate and supervise the financial activities of our housing-related government sponsored enterprises" and set prudent and appropriate minimum capital adequacy requirements.
- September: Then-House Financial Services Committee Ranking Member Barney Frank (D-MA)strongly disagrees with the Administration's assessment, saying "these two entities – Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – are not facing any kind of financial crisis … The more people exaggerate these problems, the more pressure there is on these companies, the less we will see in terms of affordable housing." (Stephen Labaton, "New Agency Proposed To Oversee Freddie Mac And Fannie Mae," The New York Times, 9/11/03)
- October: Senator Thomas Carper (D-DE) refuses to acknowledge any necessity for GSE reforms, saying "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." (Sen. Carper, Hearing of Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 10/16/03)
- November: Then-Council of the Economic Advisers (CEA) Chairman Greg Mankiw explains that any "legislation to reform GSE regulation should empower the new regulator with sufficient strength and credibility to reduce systemic risk." To reduce the potential for systemic instability, the regulator would have "broad authority to set both risk-based and minimum capital standards" and "receivership powers necessary to wind down the affairs of a troubled GSE." (N. Gregory Mankiw, Remarks At The Conference Of State Bank Supervisors State Banking Summit And Leadership, 11/6/03)
- February: The President's FY05 Budget again highlights the risk posed by the explosive growth of the GSEs and their low levels of required capital and calls for creation of a new, world-class regulator: "The Administration has determined that the safety and soundness regulators of the housing GSEs lack sufficient power and stature to meet their responsibilities, and therefore … should be replaced with a new strengthened regulator." (2005 Budget Analytic Perspectives, pg. 83)
- February: Then-CEA Chairman Mankiw cautions Congress to "not take [the financial market's] strength for granted." Again, the call from the Administration was to reduce this risk by "ensuring that the housing GSEs are overseen by an effective regulator." (N. Gregory Mankiw, Op-Ed, "Keeping Fannie And Freddie's House In Order," Financial Times, 2/24/04)
- April: Rep. Frank ignores the warnings, accusing the Administration of creating an "artificial issue." At a speech to the Mortgage Bankers Association conference, Rep. Frank said "people tend to pay their mortgages. I don't think we are in any remote danger here. This focus on receivership, I think, is intended to create fears that aren't there." ("Frank: GSE Failure A Phony Issue," American Banker, 4/21/04)
- June: Then-Treasury Deputy Secretary Samuel Bodman spotlights the risk posed by the GSEs and calls for reform, saying "We do not have a world-class system of supervision of the housing government sponsored enterprises (GSEs), even though the importance of the housing financial system that the GSEs serve demands the best in supervision to ensure the long-term vitality of that system. Therefore, the Administration has called for a new, first class, regulatory supervisor for the three housing GSEs: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banking System." (Samuel Bodman, House Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Testimony, 6/16/04)
2005
- April: Then-Secretary Snow repeats his call for GSE reform, saying "Events that have transpired since I testified before this Committee in 2003 reinforce concerns over the systemic risks posed by the GSEs and further highlight the need for real GSE reform to ensure that our housing finance system remains a strong and vibrant source of funding for expanding homeownership opportunities in America … Half-measures will only exacerbate the risks to our financial system." (Secretary John W. Snow, "Testimony Before The U.S. House Financial Services Committee," 4/13/05)
- July: Then-Minority Leader Harry Reid rejects legislation reforming GSEs, "while I favor improving oversight by our federal housing regulators to ensure safety and soundness, we cannot pass legislation that could limit Americans from owning homes and potentially harm our economy in the process." ("Dems Rip New Fannie Mae Regulatory Measure," United Press International, 7/28/05)
- August: President Bush emphatically calls on Congress to pass a reform package for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, saying "first things first when it comes to those two institutions. Congress needs to get them reformed, get them streamlined, get them focused, and then I will consider other options." (President George W. Bush, Press Conference, the White House, 8/9/07)
- August: Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Chairman Christopher Doddignores the President's warnings and calls on him to "immediately reconsider his ill-advised" position. (Eric Dash, "Fannie Mae's Offer To Help Ease Credit Squeeze Is Rejected, As Critics Complain Of Opportunism," The New York Times, 8/11/07)
- December: President Bush again warns Congress of the need to pass legislation reforming GSEs, saying "These institutions provide liquidity in the mortgage market that benefits millions of homeowners, and it is vital they operate safely and operate soundly. So I've called on Congress to pass legislation that strengthens independent regulation of the GSEs – and ensures they focus on their important housing mission. The GSE reform bill passed by the House earlier this year is a good start. But the Senate has not acted. And the United States Senate needs to pass this legislation soon." (President George W. Bush, Discusses Housing, the White House, 12/6/07)
- February: Assistant Treasury Secretary David Nason reiterates the urgency of reforms, saying "A new regulatory structure for the housing GSEs is essential if these entities are to continue to perform their public mission successfully." (David Nason, Testimony On Reforming GSE Regulation, Senate Committee On Banking, Housing And Urban Affairs, 2/7/08)
- March: President Bush calls on Congress to take action and "move forward with reforms on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. They need to continue to modernize the FHA, as well as allow State housing agencies to issue tax-free bonds to homeowners to refinance their mortgages." (President George W. Bush, Remarks To The Economic Club Of New York, New York, NY, 3/14/08)
- April: President Bush urges Congress to pass the much needed legislation and "modernize Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. [There are] constructive things Congress can do that will encourage the housing market to correct quickly by … helping people stay in their homes." (President George W. Bush, Meeting With Cabinet, the White House, 4/14/08)
- May: President Bush issues several pleas to Congress to pass legislation reforming Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac before the situation deteriorates further.
- "Americans are concerned about making their mortgage payments and keeping their homes. Yet Congress has failed to pass legislation I have repeatedly requested to modernize the Federal Housing Administration that will help more families stay in their homes, reform Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to ensure they focus on their housing mission, and allow state housing agencies to issue tax-free bonds to refinance sub-prime loans." (President George W. Bush, Radio Address, 5/3/08)
- "[T]he government ought to be helping creditworthy people stay in their homes. And one way we can do that – and Congress is making progress on this – is the reform of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. That reform will come with a strong, independent regulator." (President George W. Bush, Meeting With The Secretary Of The Treasury, the White House, 5/19/08)
- "Congress needs to pass legislation to modernize the Federal Housing Administration, reform Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to ensure they focus on their housing mission, and allow State housing agencies to issue tax-free bonds to refinance subprime loans." (President George W. Bush, Radio Address, 5/31/08)
- "Americans are concerned about making their mortgage payments and keeping their homes. Yet Congress has failed to pass legislation I have repeatedly requested to modernize the Federal Housing Administration that will help more families stay in their homes, reform Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to ensure they focus on their housing mission, and allow state housing agencies to issue tax-free bonds to refinance sub-prime loans." (President George W. Bush, Radio Address, 5/3/08)
- "[T]he government ought to be helping creditworthy people stay in their homes. And one way we can do that – and Congress is making progress on this – is the reform of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. That reform will come with a strong, independent regulator." (President George W. Bush, Meeting With The Secretary Of The Treasury, the White House, 5/19/08)
- "Congress needs to pass legislation to modernize the Federal Housing Administration, reform Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to ensure they focus on their housing mission, and allow State housing agencies to issue tax-free bonds to refinance subprime loans." (President George W. Bush, Radio Address, 5/31/08)
- "[T]he government ought to be helping creditworthy people stay in their homes. And one way we can do that – and Congress is making progress on this – is the reform of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. That reform will come with a strong, independent regulator." (President George W. Bush, Meeting With The Secretary Of The Treasury, the White House, 5/19/08)
- June: As foreclosure rates continued to rise in the first quarter, the President once again asks Congress to take the necessary measures to address this challenge, saying "we need to pass legislation to reform Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac." (President George W. Bush, Remarks At Swearing In Ceremony For Secretary Of Housing And Urban Development, Washington, D.C., 6/6/08)
- July: Congress heeds the President's call for action and passes reform legislation for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as it becomes clear that the institutions are failing.
- September: Democrats in Congress forget their previous objections to GSE reforms, as Senator Dodd questions "why weren't we doing more, why did we wait almost a year before there were any significant steps taken to try to deal with this problem? … I have a lot of questions about where was the administration over the last eight years." (Dawn Kopecki, "Fannie Mae, Freddie 'House Of Cards' Prompts Takeover," Bloomberg, 9/9/08)
Peter J. Wallison
October 31, 2009 | American Enterprise Institute
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Deregulation and the Financial Crisis
Another Urban Myth
Financial Services
Long read but it's accurate
October 31, 2009 | American Enterprise Institute
Share
Deregulation and the Financial Crisis
Another Urban Myth
Financial Services
Long read but it's accurate
The administration’s proposals for regulatory reform in the financial industry are based on the notion that the financial crisis was caused by too little regulation, and perhaps by inherent flaws in the financial system. To explain why a worldwide crisis occurred now, and not at some earlier time during the seventy years since the Great Depression, the administration’s defenders claim that deregulation or nonregulation during the last twenty years allowed banks and other financial institutions to take risks that resulted in their near-insolvency, while the large number of weak mortgages in our financial system is explained by a failure to regulate mortgage brokers.
Since the administration and Congress are proceeding as though deregulation caused the financial crisis, it is appropriate–indeed necessary–to ask: what deregulation? We have all heard it many times: the financial crisis was caused by the “repeal” of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999,[1] although even a small amount of research would have shown that the relevant provisions of Glass-Steagall were not repealed. Another bit of mythmaking is the claim that the prohibition on regulating CDS and other derivatives in the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 was a cause of the financial crisis.[2] It is not unusual to see statements by otherwise knowledgeable people that the CDS “brought the financial system to its knees.”[3] Recently, President Barack Obama justified the need for a Consumer Financial Protection Agency by claiming that predatory lending by unregulated mortgage brokers was a cause of the financial crisis:
Part of what led to this crisis were not just decisions made on Wall Street, but also unsustainable mortgage loans made across the country. While many folks took on more than they knew they could afford, too often folks signed contracts they didn’t fully understand offered by lenders who didn’t always tell the truth.[4]
Unfortunately for the administration and its supporters, these examples of “deregulation” or nonregulation do not support the argument they are making for broader regulation of the financial system. The so-called repeal of Glass-Steagall was not a repeal of the restrictions on banks’ securities trading–so banks are still subject to the prohibitions in Glass-Steagall; there is no evidence that credit default swaps or other derivatives had anything to do with the financial industry’s losses or the financial crisis; and, as outlined below, the government itself–or government requirements–appear to be the source of most of the funds and the demand for the deficient loans that were made by the unregulated mortgage brokers.
Thus, a more compelling narrative than the administration’s deregulation hypothesis would focus on the effect of over 25 million subprime and Alt-A (that is, nonprime) mortgages that are pervasive in the mortgage system in the United States. These junk loans, amounting to almost 50 percent of all mortgages, began defaulting at unprecedented rates in 2007, and the resulting losses caused the collapse of the asset-backed financing market in 2007, the near collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008, and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers the following September. Perhaps more important than these events, the loss of the asset-backed securitization market–where receivables from credit cards, consumer loans, and mortgages were financed–caused a huge reduction in financing for businesses and consumers, precipitating the current recession.
Mortgage brokers cannot create and sell deficient mortgages unless they have willing buyers, and it turns out that their main customers were government agencies or companies and banks required by government regulations to purchase these junk loans.
Since the administration and Congress are proceeding as though deregulation caused the financial crisis, it is appropriate–indeed necessary–to ask: what deregulation? We have all heard it many times: the financial crisis was caused by the “repeal” of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999,[1] although even a small amount of research would have shown that the relevant provisions of Glass-Steagall were not repealed. Another bit of mythmaking is the claim that the prohibition on regulating CDS and other derivatives in the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 was a cause of the financial crisis.[2] It is not unusual to see statements by otherwise knowledgeable people that the CDS “brought the financial system to its knees.”[3] Recently, President Barack Obama justified the need for a Consumer Financial Protection Agency by claiming that predatory lending by unregulated mortgage brokers was a cause of the financial crisis:
Part of what led to this crisis were not just decisions made on Wall Street, but also unsustainable mortgage loans made across the country. While many folks took on more than they knew they could afford, too often folks signed contracts they didn’t fully understand offered by lenders who didn’t always tell the truth.[4]
Unfortunately for the administration and its supporters, these examples of “deregulation” or nonregulation do not support the argument they are making for broader regulation of the financial system. The so-called repeal of Glass-Steagall was not a repeal of the restrictions on banks’ securities trading–so banks are still subject to the prohibitions in Glass-Steagall; there is no evidence that credit default swaps or other derivatives had anything to do with the financial industry’s losses or the financial crisis; and, as outlined below, the government itself–or government requirements–appear to be the source of most of the funds and the demand for the deficient loans that were made by the unregulated mortgage brokers.
Thus, a more compelling narrative than the administration’s deregulation hypothesis would focus on the effect of over 25 million subprime and Alt-A (that is, nonprime) mortgages that are pervasive in the mortgage system in the United States. These junk loans, amounting to almost 50 percent of all mortgages, began defaulting at unprecedented rates in 2007, and the resulting losses caused the collapse of the asset-backed financing market in 2007, the near collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008, and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers the following September. Perhaps more important than these events, the loss of the asset-backed securitization market–where receivables from credit cards, consumer loans, and mortgages were financed–caused a huge reduction in financing for businesses and consumers, precipitating the current recession.
Mortgage brokers cannot create and sell deficient mortgages unless they have willing buyers, and it turns out that their main customers were government agencies or companies and banks required by government regulations to purchase these junk loans.
Although the administration blames the production of these deficient loans primarily on unregulated mortgage brokers, many of whom it calls “predatory lenders,” this turns the mortgage market on its head. Mortgage brokers–even predatory ones–cannot create and sell deficient mortgages unless they have willing buyers, and it turns out that their main customers were government agencies or companies and banks required by government regulations to purchase these junk loans. As of the end of 2008, the Federal Housing Administration held 4.5 million subprime and Alt-A loans. Ten million were on the books of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac when they were taken over, and 2.7 million are currently held by banks that purchased them under the requirements of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). These government-mandated loans amount to almost two-thirds of all the junk mortgages in the system, and their delinquency rates are nine to fifteen times greater than equivalent rates on prime mortgages. In addition to destroying companies and neighborhoods and causing a severe recession, the accumulation of these loans on government-backed balance sheets will result in enormous losses for taxpayers in the future.
There is empirical evidence to support the idea that defaults of junk loans caused the financial crisis. In his book Getting Off Track, Stanford University economist John Taylor notes that on August 9, 2007, the spread between the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) and Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rates rose abruptly, indicating that concern about counterparty risk had suddenly taken hold among the world’s major internationally active banks. Before August 9, the LIBOR rate was usually about ten basis points higher than the OIS rate, which is a rate-free risk that reflects what the market anticipates the federal funds rate will be over the next three months. On August 9, the spread suddenly jumped to approximately sixty basis points and still remains elevated over two years later. A reasonable interpretation of this change is that information about defaulting U.S. mortgages–and ignorance about who was actually holding these loans–caused this sudden expression of counterparty risk.[5]
There is empirical evidence to support the idea that defaults of junk loans caused the financial crisis. In his book Getting Off Track, Stanford University economist John Taylor notes that on August 9, 2007, the spread between the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) and Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rates rose abruptly, indicating that concern about counterparty risk had suddenly taken hold among the world’s major internationally active banks. Before August 9, the LIBOR rate was usually about ten basis points higher than the OIS rate, which is a rate-free risk that reflects what the market anticipates the federal funds rate will be over the next three months. On August 9, the spread suddenly jumped to approximately sixty basis points and still remains elevated over two years later. A reasonable interpretation of this change is that information about defaulting U.S. mortgages–and ignorance about who was actually holding these loans–caused this sudden expression of counterparty risk.[5]
U (accessed November 2, 2009).
2. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Public Law 106-554, U.S. Statutes at Large 114 (2000): 2763, appendix E.
3. Lynn Stout, “Regulate OTC Derivatives by Deregulating Them,” Regulation 32, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 30–41.
4. White House, “President Obama Promotes Tougher Rules on Wall Street to Protect Customers,” news release, September 19, 2009, available at www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Weekly-Address-President-Obama-Promotes-Tougher-Rules-on-Wall-Street-to-Protect-Consumers (accessed November 2, 2009).
5. John B. Taylor, Getting Off Track: How Government Actions and Interventions Caused, Prolonged, and Worsened the Financial Crisis(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2009), 15–21.
2. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Public Law 106-554, U.S. Statutes at Large 114 (2000): 2763, appendix E.
3. Lynn Stout, “Regulate OTC Derivatives by Deregulating Them,” Regulation 32, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 30–41.
4. White House, “President Obama Promotes Tougher Rules on Wall Street to Protect Customers,” news release, September 19, 2009, available at www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Weekly-Address-President-Obama-Promotes-Tougher-Rules-on-Wall-Street-to-Protect-Consumers (accessed November 2, 2009).
5. John B. Taylor, Getting Off Track: How Government Actions and Interventions Caused, Prolonged, and Worsened the Financial Crisis(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2009), 15–21.
The “Repeal” of Glass-Steagall
The law known popularly as the Glass-Steagall Act initially consisted of only four short statutory provisions. Section 16 generally prohibits banks from underwriting or dealing in securities,[6] and Section 21 prohibits securities firms from taking deposits.[7] The remaining two sections, Section 20 [8] and Section 32,[9] prohibit banks from being affiliated with firms that are principally or primarily engaged in underwriting or dealing in securities. In 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)[10] repealed Sections 20 and 32, so banks could thereafter be affiliated with securities firms, but Sections 16 and 21 were left intact, so that whatever banks were forbidden or permitted to do by Glass-Steagall–before the enactment of GLBA–remains in effect. In other words, after GLBA, banks were still prohibited from underwriting and dealing in securities, although they were now permitted, under very restrictive rules discussed below, to be affiliated with investment banks.
It is incorrect to suggest that Glass-Steagall’s reapeal had any effect whatever on the ability of banks to engage directly in the risky business of underwriting and dealing in securities.
An investment bank is a securities firm–a firm specializing in the business of trading securities of all kinds. These firms are not backed by the government in any way, and–unlike commercial banks–are intended to be risk takers. The Glass-Steagall Act was designed to separate commercial banks from investment banks; it did that simply by prohibiting affiliations between the two and by prohibiting commercial banks from engaging in the business of underwriting and dealing in secure ties. After sixty-five years and many academic studies showing this separation was unnecessary and ill-advised,[11] GLBA repealed the affiliation prohibition but–as noted above– it left the restrictions on banks’ securities activities untouched.
The law known popularly as the Glass-Steagall Act initially consisted of only four short statutory provisions. Section 16 generally prohibits banks from underwriting or dealing in securities,[6] and Section 21 prohibits securities firms from taking deposits.[7] The remaining two sections, Section 20 [8] and Section 32,[9] prohibit banks from being affiliated with firms that are principally or primarily engaged in underwriting or dealing in securities. In 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)[10] repealed Sections 20 and 32, so banks could thereafter be affiliated with securities firms, but Sections 16 and 21 were left intact, so that whatever banks were forbidden or permitted to do by Glass-Steagall–before the enactment of GLBA–remains in effect. In other words, after GLBA, banks were still prohibited from underwriting and dealing in securities, although they were now permitted, under very restrictive rules discussed below, to be affiliated with investment banks.
It is incorrect to suggest that Glass-Steagall’s reapeal had any effect whatever on the ability of banks to engage directly in the risky business of underwriting and dealing in securities.
An investment bank is a securities firm–a firm specializing in the business of trading securities of all kinds. These firms are not backed by the government in any way, and–unlike commercial banks–are intended to be risk takers. The Glass-Steagall Act was designed to separate commercial banks from investment banks; it did that simply by prohibiting affiliations between the two and by prohibiting commercial banks from engaging in the business of underwriting and dealing in secure ties. After sixty-five years and many academic studies showing this separation was unnecessary and ill-advised,[11] GLBA repealed the affiliation prohibition but–as noted above– it left the restrictions on banks’ securities activities untouched.
6. See Banking Act of 1933, Public Law 73-89, U.S. Statutes At Large 48 (1933): 162. Section 16, as incorporated in 12 U.S. C 24 (Seventh), both prohibits banks from underwriting and dealing in securities and permits them to act as brokers, as follows: “The business of dealing in securities and stock by the association shall be limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own account, and the association shall not underwrite any issue of securities or stock.”
7. U.S. Code 12 § 378.
8. Ibid., 12 § 377.
9. Ibid., 12 § 78.
10. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Public Law 106-102, U.S. Statutes at Large113 (1999): 1338.
11. See, for example, the work cited in James R. Barth, R. Dan Brumbaugh Jr., and James A. Wilcox, “The Repeal of Glass-Steagall and the Advent of Broad Banking,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, no. 2 (Spring 2000), 191–204.
7. U.S. Code 12 § 378.
8. Ibid., 12 § 377.
9. Ibid., 12 § 78.
10. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Public Law 106-102, U.S. Statutes at Large113 (1999): 1338.
11. See, for example, the work cited in James R. Barth, R. Dan Brumbaugh Jr., and James A. Wilcox, “The Repeal of Glass-Steagall and the Advent of Broad Banking,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, no. 2 (Spring 2000), 191–204.
Glass-Steagall in the Context of Banking Law
Most U.S. banks are subsidiaries of bank holding companies (BHCs), ordinary corporations that have controlling positions in banks but are also permitted to engage in or control firms engaged in other financial activities. BHCs do not have the advantages available to banks–unquestioned access to the Fed’s discount window, the ability to offer insured deposits, or participation in the nation’s payment system–but they are free to engage in activities such as securities underwriting and dealing that are not permitted to banks. No one quarrels with the proposition that banks should not be able to use their insured deposits to engage in risky or speculative activities. For one thing, government-insured deposits give banks a source of funds that is lower cost than what is available to others, and thus would permit banks to compete unfairly with many other financial institutions that must raise their funds in the capital markets without government assistance. But more important than that, U.S. banking laws are designed to separate banks from the risks that might be created by the activities of their holding companies and other affiliates. This is done for two reasons: to ensure the so-called safety net (deposit insurance and access to the discount window) is not extended beyond banks to their holding companies or their nonbank affiliates, and to protect the banks’ financial positions from exposure to the risks their affiliates take, including those affiliates engaged in securities activities. Insofar as possible, the banking laws are structured to allow a holding company–and even a bank securities subsidiary–to fail without endangering the health of any related bank. This separation is effected by severely restricting the transactions between banks and their affiliates, and thus the risks that banks might take on the activities of their affiliates or subsidiaries.
In order to reduce the range of bank risk taking, banking laws and regulations also limit the activities in which banks themselves are permitted to engage. That is the context in which the Glass-Steagall Act should be viewed. As noted above, Glass-Steagall continues to prohibit banks from underwriting or dealing in securities. “Underwriting” refers to the business of assuming the risk that an issue of securities will not be fully sold to investors, while “dealing” refers to the business of holding an inventory of securities for trading purposes. Nevertheless, banks are in the business of making investments, and Glass-Steagall did not attempt to interfere with that activity. Thus, although Glass-Steagall prohibited underwriting and dealing, it did not interfere with the ability of banks to “purchase and sell” securities they acquired for investment. The difference between “purchasing and selling” and “underwriting and dealing” is crucially important. A bank may purchase a security–say, a bond–and then decide to sell it when the bank needs cash or believes the bond is no longer a good investment. This activity is different from buying an inventory of bonds for the purpose of selling them, which would be considered a dealing activity and involves considerable market risk because of the volatility of the securities markets.
It is reasonable to ask whether the repeal of the affiliation provisions of Glass-Steagall could have caused banks to suffer the losses that were a prominent feature of the financial crisis, and whether the possibility of affiliation with banks could have caused the losses to large securities firms.
Nor did Glass-Steagall ever prohibit banks from buying and selling whole loans, even though a loan could be seen as a security. When securitization was developed, banks were permitted–even under Glass-Steagall–to securitize their loan assets and sell their loans in securitized form. Similarly, banks were always permitted to buy and sell securities based on assets, such as mortgages, that they could otherwise hold as whole loans. Glass-Steagall did not affect this authority, but the act was interpreted to make clear that banks could not deal in or underwrite these or other nongovernment securities. Under this interpretation, banks could not underwrite or deal in mortgage-backed securities (MBS), but they were free to buy these securities as investment securities and sell them when they believed that would be appropriate. Again, these restrictions remained in force after GLBA; the only difference was that GLBA now permitted banks to be affiliated with firms that engaged primarily or principally in underwriting or dealing in securities, and this affiliation could be through a subsidiary of the bank’s holding company (both the bank and the securities firm would then be under common control) or through a subsidiary of the bank itself. In both cases, whether the securities firm is a holding company affiliate or a subsidiary, there are severe restrictions on transactions–outlined below–between the bank and the securities firm.
Most U.S. banks are subsidiaries of bank holding companies (BHCs), ordinary corporations that have controlling positions in banks but are also permitted to engage in or control firms engaged in other financial activities. BHCs do not have the advantages available to banks–unquestioned access to the Fed’s discount window, the ability to offer insured deposits, or participation in the nation’s payment system–but they are free to engage in activities such as securities underwriting and dealing that are not permitted to banks. No one quarrels with the proposition that banks should not be able to use their insured deposits to engage in risky or speculative activities. For one thing, government-insured deposits give banks a source of funds that is lower cost than what is available to others, and thus would permit banks to compete unfairly with many other financial institutions that must raise their funds in the capital markets without government assistance. But more important than that, U.S. banking laws are designed to separate banks from the risks that might be created by the activities of their holding companies and other affiliates. This is done for two reasons: to ensure the so-called safety net (deposit insurance and access to the discount window) is not extended beyond banks to their holding companies or their nonbank affiliates, and to protect the banks’ financial positions from exposure to the risks their affiliates take, including those affiliates engaged in securities activities. Insofar as possible, the banking laws are structured to allow a holding company–and even a bank securities subsidiary–to fail without endangering the health of any related bank. This separation is effected by severely restricting the transactions between banks and their affiliates, and thus the risks that banks might take on the activities of their affiliates or subsidiaries.
In order to reduce the range of bank risk taking, banking laws and regulations also limit the activities in which banks themselves are permitted to engage. That is the context in which the Glass-Steagall Act should be viewed. As noted above, Glass-Steagall continues to prohibit banks from underwriting or dealing in securities. “Underwriting” refers to the business of assuming the risk that an issue of securities will not be fully sold to investors, while “dealing” refers to the business of holding an inventory of securities for trading purposes. Nevertheless, banks are in the business of making investments, and Glass-Steagall did not attempt to interfere with that activity. Thus, although Glass-Steagall prohibited underwriting and dealing, it did not interfere with the ability of banks to “purchase and sell” securities they acquired for investment. The difference between “purchasing and selling” and “underwriting and dealing” is crucially important. A bank may purchase a security–say, a bond–and then decide to sell it when the bank needs cash or believes the bond is no longer a good investment. This activity is different from buying an inventory of bonds for the purpose of selling them, which would be considered a dealing activity and involves considerable market risk because of the volatility of the securities markets.
It is reasonable to ask whether the repeal of the affiliation provisions of Glass-Steagall could have caused banks to suffer the losses that were a prominent feature of the financial crisis, and whether the possibility of affiliation with banks could have caused the losses to large securities firms.
Nor did Glass-Steagall ever prohibit banks from buying and selling whole loans, even though a loan could be seen as a security. When securitization was developed, banks were permitted–even under Glass-Steagall–to securitize their loan assets and sell their loans in securitized form. Similarly, banks were always permitted to buy and sell securities based on assets, such as mortgages, that they could otherwise hold as whole loans. Glass-Steagall did not affect this authority, but the act was interpreted to make clear that banks could not deal in or underwrite these or other nongovernment securities. Under this interpretation, banks could not underwrite or deal in mortgage-backed securities (MBS), but they were free to buy these securities as investment securities and sell them when they believed that would be appropriate. Again, these restrictions remained in force after GLBA; the only difference was that GLBA now permitted banks to be affiliated with firms that engaged primarily or principally in underwriting or dealing in securities, and this affiliation could be through a subsidiary of the bank’s holding company (both the bank and the securities firm would then be under common control) or through a subsidiary of the bank itself. In both cases, whether the securities firm is a holding company affiliate or a subsidiary, there are severe restrictions on transactions–outlined below–between the bank and the securities firm.
Finally, Glass-Steagall permitted banks to underwrite and deal in government securities, or securities backed by a government, and this was also unaffected by GLBA. For example, both before and after Glass-Steagall and GLBA, banks have been able to underwrite and deal in U.S. government securities, the securities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the general obligation bonds of states and municipalities. This exemption applies mostly to securities backed by the U.S. government or by a state or municipality, although it also applies in cases where the issuer of the security is performing a government mission but is not strictly backed or guaranteed by a federal, state, or municipal government–such as with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
From this analysis, it should be clear that the GLBA’s repeal solely of the affiliation provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act did not permit banks to do anything that they were previously prohibited from doing. Accordingly, it is incorrect to suggest that Glass-Steagall’s repeal had any effect whatever on the ability of banks to engage directly in the risky business of underwriting and dealing in securities.
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to ask whether the repeal of the affiliation provisions of Glass-Steagall could have caused banks to suffer the losses that were a prominent feature of the financial crisis and whether the possibility of affiliation with banks could have caused the losses to the large securities firms–also known as investment banks–that drove one of them into bankruptcy (Lehman Brothers), two of them into becoming subsidiaries of banks (Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns), and two more into recasting themselves as BHCs under the supervision of the Fed (Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley). The remaining portions of the Glass-Steagall discussion in this Outlook will review the specific restrictions that Glass-Steagall imposes on banks, the restrictions on transactions between banks and their securities affiliates and subsidiaries, and the possibility that affiliations with a bank–permissible after GLBA–might have caused the losses suffered by the large investment banks.
From this analysis, it should be clear that the GLBA’s repeal solely of the affiliation provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act did not permit banks to do anything that they were previously prohibited from doing. Accordingly, it is incorrect to suggest that Glass-Steagall’s repeal had any effect whatever on the ability of banks to engage directly in the risky business of underwriting and dealing in securities.
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to ask whether the repeal of the affiliation provisions of Glass-Steagall could have caused banks to suffer the losses that were a prominent feature of the financial crisis and whether the possibility of affiliation with banks could have caused the losses to the large securities firms–also known as investment banks–that drove one of them into bankruptcy (Lehman Brothers), two of them into becoming subsidiaries of banks (Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns), and two more into recasting themselves as BHCs under the supervision of the Fed (Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley). The remaining portions of the Glass-Steagall discussion in this Outlook will review the specific restrictions that Glass-Steagall imposes on banks, the restrictions on transactions between banks and their securities affiliates and subsidiaries, and the possibility that affiliations with a bank–permissible after GLBA–might have caused the losses suffered by the large investment banks.
Regulation of the Securities Activities of National Banks
Almost all the big banks–including Citibank, Wachovia, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, and Wells Fargo–are national banks, chartered, regulated, and supervised by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), an office within the Treasury Department. OCC regulations allow banks to underwrite or deal only in securities backed by federal, state or local government, and the securities of companies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that are deemed to be performing a government mission.[12] Other types of securities, such as corporate bonds, municipal bonds that are not general obligations or municipalities, small-business-related securities that are investment grade, and securities related to commercial or residential mortgages, may be bought and held by banks in limited amounts, but banks may not underwrite or deal in them.[13]
Accordingly, under OCC regulations, before and after GLBA, banks could not underwrite or deal in MBS or other nongovernmental securities. They could, of course, invest in MBS, but they could do this before and after the adoption of both Glass-Steagall and GLBA, just as they were permitted to invest in the whole loans that the MBS represented. In other words, to the extent that banks suffered losses on MBS, collateralized debt obligations, or other instruments that were securitized versions of whole loans, their losses came not from underwriting or dealing in these securities, but from imprudent investments. It would be correct to say, therefore, that banks suffered losses on these securities by acting as banks–as lenders–and not as the securities traders that some commentators seem to imagine.
Bank Affiliations with Securities Firms
Although banks themselves could not underwrite or deal in MBS or other nongovernmental securities under Glass-Steagall, GLBA permitted banks to be affiliated with securities firms that were engaged in this activity. Did this newly permitted affiliation cause banks to take losses they would not have sustained if GLBA had not repealed the affiliation prohibitions in the Glass-Steagall Act? The answer again is no. Banking law and regulations prevent the activities of a bank securities affiliate or subsidiary from adversely affecting the financial condition of a related bank.
As noted above, these laws and regulations are designed to separate a bank as fully as possible from the risks its holding company takes, or by any affiliate that is a subsidiary of the holding company. Although it is possible after GLBA for a bank to hold a securities firm as a subsidiary, OCC regulations require that this subsidiary be treated like a subsidiary of the holding company, rather than like a subsidiary of the bank. The principal statutory provisions that wall off the bank from its holding company affiliates and from its own securities subsidiary are sections 23a and 23b of the Federal Reserve Act, which are applicable to all banks, whether chartered by federal or state governments. [14]
Section 23a limits the financial and other transactions between a bank and its holding company or any holding company subsidiary. For extensions of credit, the limit is 10 percent of the bank’s capital and surplus for any one holding company affiliate and 20 percent for all affiliates as a group. All such lending or extensions of credit must be collateralized with U.S. government securities up to the value of the loan, and must be overcollateralized if other types of marketable securities are used as collateral.[15] All transactions between a bank and its affiliates must be on the same terms as the bank would offer to an unrelated party.[16] Other restrictions also apply, including prohibitions on the bank’s purchase of a low-quality asset from an affiliate,[17] or the bank’s issuance of a guarantee, acceptance, or letter of credit on behalf of an affiliate.[18] All these restrictions are applied by the Comptroller of the Currency to a national bank’s relationship with a securities subsidiary and by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as the federal regulator of state-chartered insured banks.[19]
Almost all the big banks–including Citibank, Wachovia, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, and Wells Fargo–are national banks, chartered, regulated, and supervised by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), an office within the Treasury Department. OCC regulations allow banks to underwrite or deal only in securities backed by federal, state or local government, and the securities of companies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that are deemed to be performing a government mission.[12] Other types of securities, such as corporate bonds, municipal bonds that are not general obligations or municipalities, small-business-related securities that are investment grade, and securities related to commercial or residential mortgages, may be bought and held by banks in limited amounts, but banks may not underwrite or deal in them.[13]
Accordingly, under OCC regulations, before and after GLBA, banks could not underwrite or deal in MBS or other nongovernmental securities. They could, of course, invest in MBS, but they could do this before and after the adoption of both Glass-Steagall and GLBA, just as they were permitted to invest in the whole loans that the MBS represented. In other words, to the extent that banks suffered losses on MBS, collateralized debt obligations, or other instruments that were securitized versions of whole loans, their losses came not from underwriting or dealing in these securities, but from imprudent investments. It would be correct to say, therefore, that banks suffered losses on these securities by acting as banks–as lenders–and not as the securities traders that some commentators seem to imagine.
Bank Affiliations with Securities Firms
Although banks themselves could not underwrite or deal in MBS or other nongovernmental securities under Glass-Steagall, GLBA permitted banks to be affiliated with securities firms that were engaged in this activity. Did this newly permitted affiliation cause banks to take losses they would not have sustained if GLBA had not repealed the affiliation prohibitions in the Glass-Steagall Act? The answer again is no. Banking law and regulations prevent the activities of a bank securities affiliate or subsidiary from adversely affecting the financial condition of a related bank.
As noted above, these laws and regulations are designed to separate a bank as fully as possible from the risks its holding company takes, or by any affiliate that is a subsidiary of the holding company. Although it is possible after GLBA for a bank to hold a securities firm as a subsidiary, OCC regulations require that this subsidiary be treated like a subsidiary of the holding company, rather than like a subsidiary of the bank. The principal statutory provisions that wall off the bank from its holding company affiliates and from its own securities subsidiary are sections 23a and 23b of the Federal Reserve Act, which are applicable to all banks, whether chartered by federal or state governments. [14]
Section 23a limits the financial and other transactions between a bank and its holding company or any holding company subsidiary. For extensions of credit, the limit is 10 percent of the bank’s capital and surplus for any one holding company affiliate and 20 percent for all affiliates as a group. All such lending or extensions of credit must be collateralized with U.S. government securities up to the value of the loan, and must be overcollateralized if other types of marketable securities are used as collateral.[15] All transactions between a bank and its affiliates must be on the same terms as the bank would offer to an unrelated party.[16] Other restrictions also apply, including prohibitions on the bank’s purchase of a low-quality asset from an affiliate,[17] or the bank’s issuance of a guarantee, acceptance, or letter of credit on behalf of an affiliate.[18] All these restrictions are applied by the Comptroller of the Currency to a national bank’s relationship with a securities subsidiary and by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as the federal regulator of state-chartered insured banks.[19]
12. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, “Investment Securities,” Code of Federal Regulations 12, § 1.2(a), 1.2(b), available at http://www.occ.gov/fr/cfrparts/12CFR01.htm#§ 1.02 Definitions (accessed November 2, 2009).
13. Ibid.
14. U.S. Code 12 § 371c and 371c-1.
15. Ibid., 12 § 371c(c)(1).
16. Ibid., 12 § 1(a)(1).
17. Ibid., 12 § 371c(a)(3).
18. Ibid., 12 § 371c(b)(7).
19. Code of Federal Regulations 12 § 5.39(h)(5).
13. Ibid.
14. U.S. Code 12 § 371c and 371c-1.
15. Ibid., 12 § 371c(c)(1).
16. Ibid., 12 § 1(a)(1).
17. Ibid., 12 § 371c(a)(3).
18. Ibid., 12 § 371c(b)(7).
19. Code of Federal Regulations 12 § 5.39(h)(5).
Of course, if the securities firm is a subsidiary of the bank rather than a holding company affiliate, the bank will have an investment in the subsidiary that could be lost if the subsidiary fails. However, OCC regulations require that the bank “must deduct the aggregate amount of its outstanding equity investment, including retained earnings, in its [securities subsidiary] from its total assets and tangible equity and deduct such investment from its risk-based capital . . . and . . . may not consolidate the assets and liabilities of [the securities subsidiary] with those of the bank.”[20]
These restrictions substantially reduce any likelihood that the business of a securities affiliate or subsidiary will have an adverse effect on the bank. The bank’s lending to a securities affiliate or subsidiary is severely limited, must be collateralized, and must be made on the same terms the bank would offer to an unrelated third party. In addition, the bank’s investment in a securities subsidiary is not recorded as an asset on its balance sheet. In other words, the bank’s investment in its securities subsidiary is effectively written off at the time it is made. Accordingly, if the securities subsidiary should fail, there will be no impact on the bank’s regulatory capital position. Under these circumstances, it is highly unlikely that any activity carried on in a securities affiliate or securities subsidiary of a bank could have an adverse effect on the capital position of the bank.
It is also very doubtful that the restrictions of sections 23a and 23b would be ignored either by a bank as an institution or by any director, officer, or employee of a bank or its holding company. The law permits civil and criminal penalties for knowing violations of sections 23a, 23b, or any other regulation, and the civil fines can be enormous. For example, banking regulators can impose on any bank director or officer a personal, civil money penalty of up to $1 million for every day a violation continues.[21]
It thus seems clear that GLBA’s repeal of the affiliation provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act did not and could not have had any adverse effect on the financial condition of any related bank, and thus did not contribute, and could not have contributed in any way, to the financial crisis.
19. Code of Federal Regulations 12 § 5.39(h)(5).
20. Code of Federal Regulations 12 § 5.39(h)(1)(i) and (ii).
21. U.S. Code 12 § 1818(i).
These restrictions substantially reduce any likelihood that the business of a securities affiliate or subsidiary will have an adverse effect on the bank. The bank’s lending to a securities affiliate or subsidiary is severely limited, must be collateralized, and must be made on the same terms the bank would offer to an unrelated third party. In addition, the bank’s investment in a securities subsidiary is not recorded as an asset on its balance sheet. In other words, the bank’s investment in its securities subsidiary is effectively written off at the time it is made. Accordingly, if the securities subsidiary should fail, there will be no impact on the bank’s regulatory capital position. Under these circumstances, it is highly unlikely that any activity carried on in a securities affiliate or securities subsidiary of a bank could have an adverse effect on the capital position of the bank.
It is also very doubtful that the restrictions of sections 23a and 23b would be ignored either by a bank as an institution or by any director, officer, or employee of a bank or its holding company. The law permits civil and criminal penalties for knowing violations of sections 23a, 23b, or any other regulation, and the civil fines can be enormous. For example, banking regulators can impose on any bank director or officer a personal, civil money penalty of up to $1 million for every day a violation continues.[21]
It thus seems clear that GLBA’s repeal of the affiliation provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act did not and could not have had any adverse effect on the financial condition of any related bank, and thus did not contribute, and could not have contributed in any way, to the financial crisis.
19. Code of Federal Regulations 12 § 5.39(h)(5).
20. Code of Federal Regulations 12 § 5.39(h)(1)(i) and (ii).
21. U.S. Code 12 § 1818(i).
What Caused the Problems of the Largest Banks?
Since banks’ securities activities were not affected in any way by the GLBA repeal of the affiliation provisions of Glass-Steagall, one must look elsewhere for the causes of the financial weakness that many U.S. banks suffered. As noted above, there is strong evidence that despite heavy regulation, many of the banks that got into trouble did so by failing to act prudently in their investment or lending activities–in other words, in their capacity as banks–and not because they engaged in securities trading or were affiliated with investment banks that were underwriting and dealing in securities. Many banks and other financial institutions bought and held MBS that were rated AAA but performed very poorly. Others, and particularly the very large banks, in order to gain regulatory approval for expansions and mergers, committed themselves to make mortgage loans that would comply with the requirements of the CRA. These regulations, enforced by the bank regulators, required loans to borrowers at or below 80 percent of the median income, and in many cases these borrowers did not have the financial resources to meet their obligations, especially when housing prices stopped rising in late 2006 and early 2007. There are data to support this hypothesis.
In spring 2008, at the request of the Treasury Department, the Fed and the Comptroller of the Currency supervised a special process of stress testing by the nineteen largest U.S. financial institutions (most of which were bank holding companies with large subsidiary banks). Table 1 is taken from a report by the Fed on the stress tests and shows the aggregate projected losses for all nineteen institutions in an economically adverse scenario.[22] For purposes of this discussion, two items in this table stand out–the very large projected losses on first and second lien mortgages and the projected trading and counterparty losses. The former is consistent with the hypothesis advanced at the outset of this Outlook–that the largest banks committed themselves to make large numbers of CRA-qualifying loans in order to gain regulatory approval for expansions in the late 1990s and 2000s. The total projected residential mortgage losses for Bank of America, Citibank, JP Morgan Chase, and Wells Fargo are $167 billion out of a total for all nineteen institutions of $185 billion. The mortgage losses of the other banks in the survey were negligible
Since banks’ securities activities were not affected in any way by the GLBA repeal of the affiliation provisions of Glass-Steagall, one must look elsewhere for the causes of the financial weakness that many U.S. banks suffered. As noted above, there is strong evidence that despite heavy regulation, many of the banks that got into trouble did so by failing to act prudently in their investment or lending activities–in other words, in their capacity as banks–and not because they engaged in securities trading or were affiliated with investment banks that were underwriting and dealing in securities. Many banks and other financial institutions bought and held MBS that were rated AAA but performed very poorly. Others, and particularly the very large banks, in order to gain regulatory approval for expansions and mergers, committed themselves to make mortgage loans that would comply with the requirements of the CRA. These regulations, enforced by the bank regulators, required loans to borrowers at or below 80 percent of the median income, and in many cases these borrowers did not have the financial resources to meet their obligations, especially when housing prices stopped rising in late 2006 and early 2007. There are data to support this hypothesis.
In spring 2008, at the request of the Treasury Department, the Fed and the Comptroller of the Currency supervised a special process of stress testing by the nineteen largest U.S. financial institutions (most of which were bank holding companies with large subsidiary banks). Table 1 is taken from a report by the Fed on the stress tests and shows the aggregate projected losses for all nineteen institutions in an economically adverse scenario.[22] For purposes of this discussion, two items in this table stand out–the very large projected losses on first and second lien mortgages and the projected trading and counterparty losses. The former is consistent with the hypothesis advanced at the outset of this Outlook–that the largest banks committed themselves to make large numbers of CRA-qualifying loans in order to gain regulatory approval for expansions in the late 1990s and 2000s. The total projected residential mortgage losses for Bank of America, Citibank, JP Morgan Chase, and Wells Fargo are $167 billion out of a total for all nineteen institutions of $185 billion. The mortgage losses of the other banks in the survey were negligible
In the case of counterparty and trading losses, the projected total is also consistent with the hypothesis that banks themselves did little trading of securities after GLBA–either directly (which continued to be prohibited by Glass-Steagall) or indirectly through affiliates or subsidiaries. The relatively high level of trading and counterparty losses in the table–still a relatively small portion of the total–is probably attributable to including the holdings of the independent investment banks (Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley) among the nineteen institutions and the consolidation of the assets of the investment banks acquired in 2008 by JP Morgan Chase (Bear Stearns) and Bank of America (Merrill Lynch). The projected aggregate trading and counterparty losses for those four institutions alone were over $80 billion of the total of $99 billion for all nineteen institutions as a group. Similar losses for all the other banks in the survey were again negligible.
Equally important, what is clearly visible in Table 1 is that all nineteen institutions–most of which were banks–were projected to suffer losses on what anyone would consider traditional bank assets: residential and commercial mortgages, commercial loans, credit card receivables, and the like.
Accordingly, the enactment of GLBA–to the extent that it allowed banks to affiliate with securities firms–did not result in major bank losses from their own or their affiliates’ securities or trading activities. On the contrary, it seems clear that the banks got into trouble and precipitated the financial crisis and the recession by doing exactly the things we expect them to do by making loans and holding normal and traditional financial assets. The absence of any major source of projected losses coming from securities and trading activities shows that the repeal of the affiliation provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act did not induce the banks to take on unusual amounts of trading assets. Nor was trading a significant source of their projected financial losses.
Equally important, what is clearly visible in Table 1 is that all nineteen institutions–most of which were banks–were projected to suffer losses on what anyone would consider traditional bank assets: residential and commercial mortgages, commercial loans, credit card receivables, and the like.
Accordingly, the enactment of GLBA–to the extent that it allowed banks to affiliate with securities firms–did not result in major bank losses from their own or their affiliates’ securities or trading activities. On the contrary, it seems clear that the banks got into trouble and precipitated the financial crisis and the recession by doing exactly the things we expect them to do by making loans and holding normal and traditional financial assets. The absence of any major source of projected losses coming from securities and trading activities shows that the repeal of the affiliation provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act did not induce the banks to take on unusual amounts of trading assets. Nor was trading a significant source of their projected financial losses.
Was Bank Affiliation the Problem?
There is still one possibility–that GLBA’s repeal of the affiliation provisions in Glass-Steagall enabled securities firms to establish relationships with banks–and these relationships caused the near-insolvency of Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. However, this seems highly unlikely. Each of these investment banking firms had a subsidiary bank–something that would not have been possible before the repeal of the affiliation provisions of Glass-Steagall–but these bank affiliates were far too small to cause any serious losses to their massive parents. Table 2 (please see PDF of this Outlook) shows the relative size of the parent and the subsidiary bank for each of the four major securities firms.
There is still one possibility–that GLBA’s repeal of the affiliation provisions in Glass-Steagall enabled securities firms to establish relationships with banks–and these relationships caused the near-insolvency of Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. However, this seems highly unlikely. Each of these investment banking firms had a subsidiary bank–something that would not have been possible before the repeal of the affiliation provisions of Glass-Steagall–but these bank affiliates were far too small to cause any serious losses to their massive parents. Table 2 (please see PDF of this Outlook) shows the relative size of the parent and the subsidiary bank for each of the four major securities firms.
